LOYAL TO THE ExECUTIVE: THE EFFECT OF STATE CAPACITY ON LOCAL HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY
ABSTRACT State capacity is often hypothesized to reinforce democracy, wherever democracy already exists. This article demonstrates that, at the local level, capacity can actually undermine democracy by making it harder for councilors to hold mayors accountable. Drawing on the comparative method, this work analyzes the effect of bureaucratic capacity on horizontal accountability (which is critical for liberal democracy) in four municipalities in Santiago, Chile. I argue that well-funded, professionalized, and usable bureaucracies allow mayors to monopolize relationships with local communities and, thus, marginalize municipal councils as key agents of local accountability. When bureaucracies lack capacity but not usability, mayors can still manage to avoid horizontal accountability by making access to municipal resources contingent upon councilors’ loyalty. Municipal councils’ inclination towards accountability is, however, greater when local bureaucracies are highly capable but not usable. Here, the local executive lacks influence over councilors’ electoral support and, therefore, on their inclination towards accountability.
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| Format: | Digital revista |
| Langue: | English |
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Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Ciencia Política
2023
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| Accès en ligne: | http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-090X2023005000101 |
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