Misrepresentation and mental appearance
Abstract I begin by discussing an objection often lodged against higher-order theories of consciousness. The objection is that those theories do not preclude consciousness from misrepresenting the mental properties of our conscious states. I argue that there are several reasons why this objection cannot succeed. Sam Coleman (2018) agrees that the objection fails, but sees it as pointing to a related objection, which he argues poses difficulties the higher-order theorist cannot avoid. His solution is a variant theory of consciousness that invokes mental quotation in the content of a higher-order awareness. I’ll argue that mental quotation cannot be understood in any way that helps with the objection. I’ll argue also that the objection Coleman articulates is question begging, since it in effect simply channels a first-order approach to consciousness, and has no independent basis apart from that.
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Digital revista |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidade Estadual Paulista, Departamento de Filosofia
2018
|
| Online Access: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31732018000500049 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|