VAGUENESS AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: A NEW REPLY TO VAN INWAGEN
Abstract One of the few points of agreement between most theists and non-theists working on the problem of evil is that the existence of a perfect God is incompatible with the existence of pointless evil. In a series of influential papers, however, Peter van Inwagen has argued that careful attention to the reasoning behind this claim reveals fatal difficulties related to the Sorites Paradox. In this paper, I explain van Inwagen’s appeal to sorites reasoning, distinguish between two different arguments in his work, and argue that they both commit the same so-far-unnoticed mistake.
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| Format: | Digital revista |
| Language: | English |
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UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
2021
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| Online Access: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400049 |
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