Philosophy and disagreement
Summary: Disagreement as we find it in both the history and the contemporary practice of philosophy is an inadequately understood phenomenon. In this paper I outline and motivate the problem of disagreement, arguing that “hard cases” of disagreement confront us with an unresolved, and seemingly unresolvable, challenge to the rationality of philosophical discourse, thereby raising the specter of a worrisome form of metaphilosophical skepticism. A variety of responses and attempted evasions are considered, though none are found to be particularly satisfying: Thus, the specter remains unexorcised.
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| Format: | Digital revista |
| Langue: | English |
| Publié: |
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
2011
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| Accès en ligne: | http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-15032011000100003 |
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