Economic incentives for soil conservation: a dinamic game model
This paper presents a theoretical model to analyze the incentives for protecting soil productivity in presence of separation of property and control in agricultural land. Using a dynamic model of contracts between the landlords and operators we analyze the incentives of different type of contracts (fixed rate contracts or sharecropping contracts) and their potential impact on soil conservation. The main research question of this paper is: do landlords and tenants have conflicting incentives regarding soil conservation? Our theoretical results are consistent with previous empirical literature that find that, depending on the contract specifications, there are no conflicting incentives.
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| Format: | info:ar-repo/semantics/documento de conferencia biblioteca |
| Language: | eng |
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International Association of Agricultural Economists
2018-07-28
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| Subjects: | Economía, Análisis Económico, Tenencia de la Tierra, Utilización de la Tierra, Tierras, Productividad de la Tierra, Agricultura, Economics, Economic Analysis, Land Tenure, Land Use, Land, Land Productivity, Agriculture, Argentina, |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12123/8874 https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275871 http://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.275871 |
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oai:localhost:20.500.12123-88742021-03-12T11:09:38Z Economic incentives for soil conservation: a dinamic game model Benito Amaro, Ignacio Economía Análisis Económico Tenencia de la Tierra Utilización de la Tierra Tierras Productividad de la Tierra Agricultura Economics Economic Analysis Land Tenure Land Use Land Land Productivity Agriculture Argentina This paper presents a theoretical model to analyze the incentives for protecting soil productivity in presence of separation of property and control in agricultural land. Using a dynamic model of contracts between the landlords and operators we analyze the incentives of different type of contracts (fixed rate contracts or sharecropping contracts) and their potential impact on soil conservation. The main research question of this paper is: do landlords and tenants have conflicting incentives regarding soil conservation? Our theoretical results are consistent with previous empirical literature that find that, depending on the contract specifications, there are no conflicting incentives. Este artículo presenta un modelo teórico para analizar los incentivos para proteger la productividad del suelo en presencia de separación de propiedad y control en tierras agrícolas. Utilizando un modelo dinámico de contratos entre los propietarios y los operadores, analizamos los incentivos de diferentes tipos de contratos (contratos de tasa fija o contratos de aparcería) y su impacto potencial en la conservación del suelo. La principal pregunta de investigación de este documento es: ¿los propietarios y los inquilinos tienen incentivos contradictorios con respecto a la conservación del suelo? Nuestros resultados teóricos son consistentes con la literatura empírica previa que encuentra que, dependiendo de las especificaciones del contrato, no existen incentivos contradictorios. Instituto de Economía Fil: Benito Amaro, Ignacio. Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA). Instituto de Economía; Argentina 2021-03-12T10:53:21Z 2021-03-12T10:53:21Z 2018-07-28 info:ar-repo/semantics/documento de conferencia info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12123/8874 https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275871 Benito Amaro, I. (2018). Economic incentives for soil conservation: a dinamic game model. IN Conference, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, British Columbia, International Association of Agricultural Economists. http://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.275871 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf International Association of Agricultural Economists 30th International Conference of Agricultural Economists, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, Canadá |
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| language |
eng |
| topic |
Economía Análisis Económico Tenencia de la Tierra Utilización de la Tierra Tierras Productividad de la Tierra Agricultura Economics Economic Analysis Land Tenure Land Use Land Land Productivity Agriculture Argentina Economía Análisis Económico Tenencia de la Tierra Utilización de la Tierra Tierras Productividad de la Tierra Agricultura Economics Economic Analysis Land Tenure Land Use Land Land Productivity Agriculture Argentina |
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Economía Análisis Económico Tenencia de la Tierra Utilización de la Tierra Tierras Productividad de la Tierra Agricultura Economics Economic Analysis Land Tenure Land Use Land Land Productivity Agriculture Argentina Economía Análisis Económico Tenencia de la Tierra Utilización de la Tierra Tierras Productividad de la Tierra Agricultura Economics Economic Analysis Land Tenure Land Use Land Land Productivity Agriculture Argentina Benito Amaro, Ignacio Economic incentives for soil conservation: a dinamic game model |
| description |
This paper presents a theoretical model to analyze the incentives for protecting soil productivity in presence of separation of property and control in agricultural land. Using a dynamic model of contracts between the landlords and operators we analyze the incentives of different type of contracts (fixed rate contracts or sharecropping contracts) and their potential impact on soil conservation. The main research question of this paper is: do landlords and tenants have conflicting incentives regarding soil conservation? Our theoretical results are consistent with previous empirical literature that find that, depending on the contract specifications, there are no conflicting incentives. |
| format |
info:ar-repo/semantics/documento de conferencia |
| topic_facet |
Economía Análisis Económico Tenencia de la Tierra Utilización de la Tierra Tierras Productividad de la Tierra Agricultura Economics Economic Analysis Land Tenure Land Use Land Land Productivity Agriculture Argentina |
| author |
Benito Amaro, Ignacio |
| author_facet |
Benito Amaro, Ignacio |
| author_sort |
Benito Amaro, Ignacio |
| title |
Economic incentives for soil conservation: a dinamic game model |
| title_short |
Economic incentives for soil conservation: a dinamic game model |
| title_full |
Economic incentives for soil conservation: a dinamic game model |
| title_fullStr |
Economic incentives for soil conservation: a dinamic game model |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Economic incentives for soil conservation: a dinamic game model |
| title_sort |
economic incentives for soil conservation: a dinamic game model |
| publisher |
International Association of Agricultural Economists |
| publishDate |
2018-07-28 |
| url |
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12123/8874 https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275871 http://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.275871 |
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AT benitoamaroignacio economicincentivesforsoilconservationadinamicgamemodel |
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