Economic incentives for soil conservation: a dinamic game model

This paper presents a theoretical model to analyze the incentives for protecting soil productivity in presence of separation of property and control in agricultural land. Using a dynamic model of contracts between the landlords and operators we analyze the incentives of different type of contracts (fixed rate contracts or sharecropping contracts) and their potential impact on soil conservation. The main research question of this paper is: do landlords and tenants have conflicting incentives regarding soil conservation? Our theoretical results are consistent with previous empirical literature that find that, depending on the contract specifications, there are no conflicting incentives.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Benito Amaro, Ignacio
Format: info:ar-repo/semantics/documento de conferencia biblioteca
Language:eng
Published: International Association of Agricultural Economists 2018-07-28
Subjects:Economía, Análisis Económico, Tenencia de la Tierra, Utilización de la Tierra, Tierras, Productividad de la Tierra, Agricultura, Economics, Economic Analysis, Land Tenure, Land Use, Land, Land Productivity, Agriculture, Argentina,
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12123/8874
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275871
http://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.275871
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