An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
A newly created dataset including 239 decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission on horizontal mergers is used to estimate the different factors affecting the Commission's resolution decisions. The decision-making process has been approximated by two different discrete choice models. Our results indicate that, contrary to the Commission's objective, the presence of efficiency gains increases the probability of a case being challenged. We also find that factors different from the ones explicitly mentioned by the Commission have a significant effect upon the Commission's final decision. In particular, the presence of a foreign company among the would-be merger firms significantly increases the likelihood of observing an allowed merger.
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal Article biblioteca |
| Language: | EN |
| Published: |
2008
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| Subjects: | Mergers, Acquisitions, Restructuring, Voting, Proxy Contests, Corporate Governance G340, Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G380, Antitrust Law K210, Monopolization, Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L410, Formal and Informal Sectors, Shadow Economy, Institutional Arrangements O170, |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4798 |
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