Ripe for a Big Bang? Assessing the Political Feasibility of Legislative Reforms in the Philippines’ Local Government Code

In the Philippines' highly decentralized political system, smooth functioning of inter-governmental relations is key to effective service delivery and good governance overall. Although considered a milestone, the 1991 Local Government Code, the Philippines' basic legislation governing inter-governmental relations, contains provisions that thwart vertical and horizontal resource equalization among local government units, and contributes to mismatch between expenditure assignments and the fiscal capacities of the local government units. Numerous technical reports have called for adjustments to the existing revenue and expenditure assignments, yet no tangible progress has been made. This paper assesses the prospects of legislative reforms on the revenue side of the decentralization framework. Using a variety of approaches ranging from a historical analysis to institutional analysis of the legislative dynamics in the Philippine congress, it assesses the prospects of a major overhaul of the Local Government Code and concludes that a significant reform is highly unlikely under the conditions prevailing in the late 2010s. By implication, any effort to improve the Philippines' inter-governmental framework will have to settle for sub-optimal incremental measures within the inefficient revenue assignment arrangement.

Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Matsuda, Yasuhiko
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca
Language:	English
Published:	2011-09-01
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY, ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE, ASSETS, BICAMERAL BODY, CABINET, CANDIDATES, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, CENTRALIZING, CITIES, CIVIL SOCIETY, COLLECTIVE ACTION, COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM, COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS, CONSTITUENCIES, CONSTITUENCY, CONSTITUENT, CONSTITUENTS, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS, CONVERSIONS, DECENTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, DEVOLUTION, DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE, DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES, DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS, DISTRICT, DISTRICTS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ELECTION, ELECTIONS FOR GOVERNORS, EQUALIZATION, EQUIPMENT, EXPENDITURE, EXPENDITURE ALLOCATION, EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENT, EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS, EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES, EXPENDITURES, FAIR MARKET VALUE, FEDERALISM, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, FINANCIAL RESOURCES, FISCAL AUTONOMY, FISCAL CAPACITIES, FISCAL CRISIS, FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, FISCAL IMBALANCE, FISCAL MANAGEMENT, FISCAL PERFORMANCE, FISCAL RESOURCES, FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY, FISCAL TRANSFERS, FUTURES, GOOD GOVERNANCE, GOVERNOR, GOVERNORS, GROSS RECEIPTS, HORIZONTAL EQUITY, HORIZONTAL IMBALANCES, INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFERS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM, INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS, INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT, INTERNAL REVENUES, INTERNATIONAL BANK, INVESTING, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, LAWS, LEGAL FRAMEWORK, LEGAL REFORM, LEGISLATION, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, LEGISLATOR, LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, LEVY, LOCAL CONSTITUENTS, LOCAL DEVELOPMENT, LOCAL ELECTIONS, LOCAL EXPENDITURES, LOCAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX, LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, LOCAL JURISDICTIONS, LOCAL OFFICIALS, LOCAL POLITICIANS, LOCAL REVENUES, LOCAL TAXATION, LOCAL TAXES, LOWER HOUSE, MAYOR, MAYORS, MUNICIPAL, MUNICIPAL MAYORS, MUNICIPALITIES, MUNICIPALITY, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL LEGISLATORS, NATIONAL POLICIES, NATIONAL TAXES, NATIONAL TREASURY, NATURAL RESOURCES, PARTY DISCIPLINE, POLICY FRAMEWORK, POLICY PRIORITIES, POLITICAL CAPITAL, POLITICAL CHANGE, POLITICAL CONTROL, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL LANDSCAPE, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL PARTY, POLITICAL POWER, POLITICAL SYSTEM, POLITICAL SYSTEMS, POLITICAL THEORY, PRIVATIZATION, PRODUCTIVITY, PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS, PROPERTY OWNERS, PROPERTY TAX, PROVINCE, PROVINCES, PROVINCIAL COUNCIL, PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS, PROVINCIAL LEVEL, PROVINCIAL SALES, PUBLIC DEBT, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM, PUBLIC SERVICES, PUBLIC UTILITIES, REAL INTEREST, REAL PROPERTY, REDISTRIBUTION, REGULATORY POWER, REPRESENTATIVES, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, RETURN, REVENUE ASSIGNMENT, REVENUE ASSIGNMENTS, REVENUE CAPACITY, REVENUE COLLECTION, REVENUE COLLECTIONS, SALES TAX, SECOND READING, SERVICE DELIVERY, SOCIAL WELFARE, STATE GOVERNORS, STATE LEGISLATURES, SUB-NATIONAL, SUB-NATIONAL BORROWING, SUB-NATIONAL DEBTS, SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, TAX, TAX ASSIGNMENT, TAX ASSIGNMENTS, TAX BASES, TAX BURDENS, TAX EFFORT, TAX EXEMPTIONS, TAX PAYMENTS, TAX REVENUES, TAXATION, THIRD READING, TOTAL EXPENDITURE, TRANSACTION, TRANSACTION COST, TRANSFER SYSTEM, UPPER HOUSE,
Online Access:	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110909084732 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3556
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