External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars

The authors combine an empirical model of external intervention, with a theoretical model of civil war duration. Their empirical model of intervention allows them to analyze civil war duration, using "expected" rather than "actual" external intervention as an explanatory variable in the duration model. Unlike previous studies, they find that external intervention is positively associated with the duration of civil war. They distinguish partial third-party interventions that extend the length of war, from multilateral "peace" operations, which have a mandate to restore peace without taking sides - and which typically take place at war's end, or at least when both sides have agreed to a cease-fire. In a future paper, the authors will examine whether partial third-party interventions - whatever their effect on a war's duration - increase the risk of war's recurrence. If that proves true, then even if interventions reduce the length of civil war, they may do so at the cost of further destabilizing the political system, and sowing the seeds of future rebellion.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Elbadawi, Ibrahim A., Sambanis, Nicholas
Format: Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2000-09
Subjects:BOUNDARIES, CIVIL CONFLICTS, CIVIL WAR, CIVIL WAR DATA, CIVIL WAR DATABASE, CIVIL WARS, COLD WAR, COMBAT, COMBAT BETWEEN GROUPS, COMMODITY PRICE UNCERTAINTY, CONFLICT, CRIME, DEBT, DURATION OF CONFLICTS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC MODEL OF GUERRILLA WARFARE, ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE, EFFECTIVENESS OF REBELS, ETHNIC CONFLICTS, ETHNIC DIVERSITY, ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION, ETHNIC FRAGMENTATION, ETHNIC GROUP, ETHNIC POLARIZATION, ETHNICALLY DIVERSE SOCIETIES, EXTERNAL INTERVENTION, EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS, EXTERNAL THIRD PARTY, FOREIGN INTERVENTION, FOREIGN INVESTORS, FORM OF MILITARY, GOVERNMENT ARMY, GOVERNMENT REPRESSION, GUERRILLA WARFARE, HAZARD FUNCTION, HAZARD OF WAR, HOMOGENOUS SOCIETIES, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL WAR, INTRASTATE CONFLICTS, JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, MASSIVE ONSLAUGHTS, MILITARY CAPABILITY, MILITARY PERSONNEL, NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS, PEACE, PEACE ENFORCEMENT, PEACE RESEARCH, PEACEKEEPING, PEACEMAKING, POLARIZATION, POLITICAL RIGHTS, POLITICAL VIOLENCE, PREDATOR-PREY MODEL, PROBABILITY OF DURATION OF WAR, REBEL COHESION, REBEL FIGHTING FORCE, REBEL FORCES, REBEL MOVEMENT, REBEL ORGANIZATIONS, REBEL VICTORY, REBELLION, REBELLIONS, REBELS FORCES, RISK OF WAR, SOCIAL POLARIZATION, SOLDIERS, STATE CONFLICT, STATE CONFLICTS, STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, TERRORISM, WAR COUNTRY, WAR DURATION, WAR PROJECT, WAR THEORY,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/09/693318/external-interventions-duration-civil-wars
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19794
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