The authors develop and test several new
hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central
bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of
different institutions and different degrees of citizen
information about government policies. Theory provides
strong reason to believe that while central bank
independence will prove more effective as a commitment
mechanism in countries where multiple players in government
have veto power (checks and balances), the number of veto
players will have no effect on the credibility of exchange
rate pegs. Conversely, the authors argue that central bank
independence does not solve the problems of commitment that
arise when citizens are imperfectly informed about the
contribution of government policy to inflation. Exchange
rate pegs, however, mitigate these problems. The authors
present extensive evidence from cross-country tests using
newly developed data that provide strong support for their propositions.
Detalles Bibliográficos
| Autores principales: |
Keefer, Philip,
Stasavage, David |
|---|
| Formato: | Policy Research Working Paper
biblioteca
|
|---|
| Idioma: | English
en_US |
|---|
| Publicado: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2001-02
|
|---|
| Materias: | CENTRAL BANK,
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE,
CENTRAL BANKS,
COMPETITION POLICY,
CPI,
CURRENCY BOARD,
DECISION MAKING,
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS,
DEVALUATION,
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
DISCOUNT RATE,
DOMESTIC INFLATION,
DOMESTIC PRICES,
ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS,
ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES,
ECONOMIC GROWTH,
ECONOMIC POLICIES,
ECONOMICS,
EQUILIBRIUM,
EXCHANGE RATE,
EXCHANGE RATE PEG,
EXOGENOUS SHOCKS,
EXPORTS,
FINANCE MINISTRY,
FISCAL DEFICIT,
FISCAL POLICIES,
FISCAL POLICY,
FIXED EXCHANGE RATE,
FIXED EXCHANGE RATES,
FORECASTS,
FOREIGN CURRENCY,
FOREIGN EXCHANGE,
FOREIGN INFLATION,
HIGH INFLATION,
IMPORTS,
INFLATION RATE,
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS,
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT,
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING,
LEGISLATION,
LONG TERM,
MACROECONOMIC POLICY,
MONETARY FINANCING,
MONETARY INSTITUTIONS,
MONETARY POLICIES,
MONETARY POLICY,
MONEY DEMAND,
MONEY MULTIPLIER,
MONEY SUPPLY,
NATIONAL INCOME,
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE,
NON-OECD COUNTRIES,
POLICY CREDIBILITY,
POLICY DECISIONS,
POLICY MAKERS,
POLICY OUTCOMES,
POLICY REFORM,
POLICY RESEARCH,
POLICY TARGETS,
PRICE INCREASES,
PRIVATE INFORMATION,
PRIVATE SECTOR,
RATE OF INFLATION,
REDUCING INFLATION,
SIGNALING,
STANDARD DEVIATION,
TERMS OF TRADE,
TRADEOFFS,
WELFARE FUNCTION CHECKS & BALANCES,
CENTRAL BANK ROLES,
EXCHANGE RATES,
GOVERNMENT POLICY,
PUBLIC INFORMATION,
CROSS COUNTRY ANALYSIS,
INFLATION RATES,
INFLATIONARY PRESSURES,
ECONOMIC SHOCKS, |
|---|
| Acceso en línea: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/02/1000495/checks-balances-private-information-credibility-monetary-commitments
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15746
|
|---|
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
|---|
