The recent literature on law and finance
has drawn attention to the importance of creditor rights in
influencing the development of financial systems and in
affecting firm corporate governance and financing patterns.
Recent financial crises have also highlighted the importance
of insolvency systems to resolve corporate sector financial
distress. The literature and crises have emphasized the
complex role of creditor rights, affecting not only the
efficiency of ex-post resolution of distressed corporations,
but also influencing ex-ante risk-taking incentives and an
economy's degree of entrepreneurship more generally.
The authors document how often bankruptcy is actually being
used for a panel of 35 countries. Next they investigate the
effects of specific design features of insolvency regimes in
relation to the quality of the countries' overall
judicial systems on the use of bankruptcy. The authors find,
correcting for overall financial development and
macroeconomic shocks, that bankruptcies are higher in
Anglo-Saxon countries and in market-oriented financial
systems characterized by weaker and multiple banking
relationships. They also find that greater judicial
efficiency is associated with more use of bankruptcy, but
that the combination of stronger creditor rights with
greater judicial efficiency leads to less use. The authors
find that the presence of a "stay on assets" leads
to fewer bankruptcies independent of the efficiency of the
judicial system. These findings suggest that there are
important incentive effects of insolvency systems
encouraging less risky behavior and more out-of-court settlements.
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: |
Claessens, Stijn,
Klapper, Leora F. |
Format: | Policy Research Working Paper
biblioteca
|
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2002-07
|
Subjects: | ACCOUNTING,
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
ASSETS,
BANK LOANS,
BANKRUPTCY,
BANKRUPTCY CODE,
BANKRUPTCY COURTS,
BANKRUPTCY LAW,
BANKRUPTCY LAWS,
BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURES,
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS,
BORROWING,
CAPITAL MARKETS,
CIVIL LAW,
COMMON LAW,
CORPORATE FINANCE,
CORRUPTION,
COUNTRY COMPARISONS,
CREDITOR,
CREDITORS,
DEBT RESTRUCTURING,
DEBTOR,
DEBTORS,
DEFAULTS,
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH,
DIVIDEND PAYOUT,
DOMESTIC DEBT,
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
ECONOMIC RESEARCH,
EMPLOYMENT,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
EQUALITY,
EQUITY INVESTMENT,
EQUITY MARKETS,
FINANCIAL CRISES,
FINANCIAL CRISIS,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
FINANCIAL MARKETS,
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE,
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS,
FIXED COSTS,
GDP,
GDP PER CAPITA,
GOING CONCERN VALUE,
GROWTH RATE,
INCENTIVE EFFECTS,
INHERITANCE,
INSOLVENCY,
INTEREST RATES,
LAW CODES,
LEGAL FRAMEWORK,
LEGAL RIGHTS,
LEGAL SYSTEMS,
LEGALITY,
LIQUIDATION,
MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS,
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE,
MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS,
POLITICAL ECONOMY,
PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT,
PROFITABILITY,
QUALITY OF LAWS,
REAL GDP,
REAL INTEREST RATE,
REORGANIZATION,
REPUDIATION,
RESOURCE ALLOCATION,
RULE OF LAW,
SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES,
TIME SERIES,
TRANSACTION COSTS,
TRANSITION ECONOMIES,
VALUATION,
WORKING CAPITAL BANKRUPTCY,
CREDITWORTHINESS,
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS,
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT,
MARKET ECONOMY,
BANKING SYSTEMS, |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/07/1963446/bankruptcy-around-world-explanations-relative-use
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14259
|
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|