Rebidding for Concessions
The longer a concession lasts, the less effect the initial rounds of bidding will have on the terms of the concession over its full life. Much more influential will be periodic renegotiations or price reviews, which under standard concessions are hard to settle by competition. It has been suggested that competition could be brought to bear by periodically reauctioning a concession, which would limit the potential for exercise of market power by concessionaires. If contracts can be well written and rebidding is practical, periodic reauctioning offers an effective solution to the natural monoply problem. Price regulation may no longer be necessary, and rebidding may help with contract adjustment. This Note examines the case for rebidding.
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| Format: | Viewpoint biblioteca |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
1998-11
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| Subjects: | ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE, ASSET VALUATION, ASSETS, AUCTION, BID, BIDDERS, BIDDING, COMPETITIVE MARKETS, CONSUMERS, DEBT, FREE ENTRY, HOSTILE TAKEOVER, MARKET ENTRY, MARKET POWER, MEDIAN VOTERS, NATURAL MONOPOLY, NET WORTH, PRICE SETTING, PRICE STRUCTURES, PRICING POLICY, PROPERTY RIGHTS, RETAIL, RISK PREMIUM, SHAREHOLDINGS, SUSTAINABILITY, TAKEOVER, VOTERS, WEALTH BIDDING, CONCESSIONS, AUCTIONS, ECONOMIC COMPETITION, |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441574/rebidding-concessions http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11524 |
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