Autonomy, Freedom and Rights [electronic resource] : A Critique of Liberal Subjectivity /

Autonomy, viewed as a subject's autonomous designing of her own distinctive 'individuality', is not a constitutive problem for liberal theory. Since its earliest formulations, liberalism has taken it for granted that protecting rights is a sufficient guarantee for the primacy of individual subjectivity. The most dangerous legacy of the 'hierarchical-dualist' representation of the subject is the primacy given to reason in defining an individual's identity. For Santoro freedom is not a fixed measure. It is not the container of powers and rights defining an individual's role and identity. It is rather the outcome of a process whereby individuals continuously re-define the shape of their individuality. Freedom is everything that each of us manages to be in his or her active and uncertain opposition to external 'pressures'.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Santoro, Emilio. author., SpringerLink (Online service)
Format:	Texto biblioteca
Language:	eng
Published:	Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 2003
Subjects:	Philosophy., Political science., Law, Law., Philosophy of Law., Political Science., Theories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History., Philosophy, general.,
Online Access:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0823-4
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