How logrolling can explain the failure of the government coalition in Brazil
This article presents an analysis of the behavior of federal representatives in the Brazilian House of Representatives between 1995 and 1998, when a series of constitutional amendments were presented by the president to be voted on by Congress. The objective is to show that the lack of a stable government coalition resulted in costs to society that were not anticipated by the government. The study argues that a logroll - a trade of votes - was the strategy used by the government in order to guarantee the number of votes necessary to approve the amendments. This strategy created a vicious system in which representatives would only vote with the government if they had benefits in return.
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| Format: | Digital revista |
| Langue: | English |
| Publié: |
Fundação Getulio Vargas
2006
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| Accès en ligne: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-76122006000500006 |
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