First Person Authority And Knowledge Of One's Own Actions
Summary What is the relation between first person authority and knowledge of one's own actions? On one view, it is because we know the reasons for which we act that we know what we do and, analogously, it is because we know the reasons for which we avow a belief that we know what we believe. Carlos Moya (2006) attributes some such theory to Richard Moran (2001) and criticises it on the grounds of circularity. In this paper, I examine the view attributed to Moran. I rebut the charge of circularity, but also reject the theory as an adequate interpretation of Moran.
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Digital revista |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado: |
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
2013
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| Acceso en línea: | http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-15032013000200003 |
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