Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan

Using data from a field experiment in 500 villages, this paper studies how local institutions affect the quality of governance, as measured by aid distribution outcomes. In villages where elected councils exist and manage distributions, aid targeting improves. However, if the distribution is not clearly assigned to either the council or customary leaders, the creation of elected councils increases embezzlement and makes decision-making less inclusive. Requiring that women manage the distribution jointly with customary leaders also increases embezzlement. Thus, while elected councils can improve governance, overlapping mandates between new and existing institutions may result in increased rent-seeking.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Beath, Andrew, Christia, Fotini, Enikolopov, Ruben
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2013-06
Subjects:	ABUSE OF POWER, ACCOUNTABILITY, CAUSAL EFFECTS, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, CITIZENS, CIVIL WAR, COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, COLLECTIVE ACTION, COMMUNIST, COMMUNITIES, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE, COMMUNITY MEMBERS, COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT, CONSENSUS, CONSULTATION, CONSULTATIONS, CORRUPTION, COUNCILS, COUNTRYSIDE, CREDIBILITY, DATA ANALYSIS, DATA COLLECTION, DECISION MAKERS, DECISION-MAKERS, DECISION-MAKING, DECISION-MAKING PROCESS, DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES, DECISIONMAKING, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, DEMOCRATIZATION, DISTRICT LEVEL, DISTRICTS, DRINKING WATER, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC POLICY, ELECTORAL RULES, EMBEZZLEMENT, FACTOR ENDOWMENTS, FEMALE, FIELD EXPERIMENT, FIGURES, FINANCIAL SUPPORT, FOOD SHORTAGES, FORMAL EDUCATION, GENDER, GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS, GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES, GOVERNANCE QUALITY, GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION, HOUSEHOLDS, HUMAN CAPITAL, INCOME, INEQUALITY, INFANT MORTALITY, INSTITUTION BUILDING, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, INSTITUTIONAL REFORM, INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES, INTENDED BENEFICIARIES, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INTERVENTION, INTERVENTIONS, LEGITIMACY, LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION, LINE MINISTRIES, LIVESTOCK, LOCAL BODIES, LOCAL GOVERNANCE, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, LOCAL INSTITUTIONS, LOCAL PARTICIPATION, MARGINALIZED GROUPS, NATIONAL LEVEL, PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN, POLITICAL AUTHORITY, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICIANS, POWER-HOLDERS, PREPARATION, PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION, PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC POLICIES, PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC RESOURCES, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE, PUBLIC SERVICE, QUANTITATIVE DATA, RECONSTRUCTION, REHABILITATION, RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR, RENTS, REVOLUTION, RURAL AREAS, RURAL POPULATION, SEPARATION OF POWERS, SOCIAL CAPITAL, SOCIAL COHESION, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, SOCIOECONOMIC DATA, SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS, TAXATION, TRANSPARENCY, VILLAGE, VILLAGE ELDERS, VILLAGE LEVEL, VILLAGER, VILLAGERS, VILLAGES, YOUTH,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17928979/elected-councils-improve-governance-experimental-evidence-local-institutions-afghanistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15869
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